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The Impact of Ownership on Companies’ Investment Rates in Ukraine 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically analyze the impact of ownership groups on companies’ 
investment rates in Ukraine using a new dynamic Tobin’s Q model allowing investment rates 
to depend on present and lagged Q. We find that the presence of a majority in and increases 
in state, non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership has a significantly negative 
impact on investment rates. State and insider ownership are associated with soft budget 
constraints whereas non-domestic, financial companies’ and financial and industrial groups’ 
ownership with hard budget constraints. The dynamic model shows persistence in the market-
to-book value of equity, the proxy for Q.  
Keywords: Investment, Ownership, Corporate Governance, Investment, Financial 
Constraints, Soft Budget Constraints, Private Benefits of Control 
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1. Ownership and Investment Rates 
Recent studies on companies’ investment rates in Eastern European economies (for example, 
Lizal and Svejnar (2002), Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013)) 
provide evidence for the explanatory power of different ownership groups and corporate 
governance variables   The main reasons for these seem to be the role of soft and hard budget 
constraints and the varying degree of the magnitude of private benefits of control (Mykhayliv 
and Zauner ((2013), (2015)) of the different ownership groups. In contrast to the literature, 
we analyze investment rates using a dynamic Tobin’s Q model where companies’ investment 
rates are allowed to depend on the present and past market-to-book value of equity, the proxy 
for Tobin’s Q. We measure soft and hard budget constraints using interaction terms of cash 
flow with ownership group indicators. 
In the context of companies in transitional economies, the relationship between state 
ownership and companies’ performance is of particular interest (Megginson and Netter 
(2001)). An important factor in explaining companies’ investment rates of state owned 
companies is the concept of soft budget constraints (Kornai (1979), Kornai (1980), Kornai, 
Maskin and Roland (2003)), that is, activities that allow companies to neglect financial 
discipline. Even though there is ample evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints, 
the empirical link between companies’ performance (Djankov and Murrell (2002),  Estrin and 
Rosevear (1999, 1999a), Grygorenko and Lutz (2007)) or investment (Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)) and state ownership is surprisingly weak in Central 
and  Eastern European countries. An important hypothesis is therefore whether the state 
ownership is negatively related to companies’ investment rates. 
There are two more important factors that weigh on investment rates and the 
performance of companies in transition countries. The second factor is related to actions that 
reduce the value of the company in order to improve the private welfare of some individuals 
or groups who are able to exert control over the company against the welfare of shareholders. 
These actions are commonly labelled tunnelling ((Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes and 
Shleifer (2000)), asset stripping (Campos and Giovannoni (2006)) or, in a less pronounced 
form, private benefits of control ((Grossman and Hart (1988), Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013)). 
In Ukraine, for example, value-decreasing activities like share dilutions and asset stripping 
are common and not explicitly illegal (Mycyk, Cook and Fedoruk (2007)). 
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The third factor is related to financial imperfections in the form of hard budget 
constraints or financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)). Under general 
equilibrium assumptions, the capital structure of a company is irrelevant (Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)) and it does not matter whether internal or external funds are used to finance 
investment. However, as it is well known that external funds are typically more costly than 
internal funds due agency and information issues.   
Given these three and other factors, ownership plays an important role in the 
performance  and investment behaviour of companies, particularly where ownership and 
control functions are separated (Fama and Jensen (1983)). This paper tries to analyze the 
impact of different ownership groups (state, insider or management, non-domestic, finance, 
and financial and industrial groups (FIG)) on investment rates. We also investigate the impact 
of absolute majority ownership and the existence of a significant minority with the ability to 
block major decisions within the company on investment rates. We also try to gauge the 
effect of the three different factors detailed above in explaining investment rates. 
There are two theories that to a large degree explain companies’ investment rates, the 
cash constraint and the management discretion theory (Hadlock (1998)). The cash constraints 
theory relates low investment rates to hard budget constraints whereas the manager discretion 
theory relates it to the abusive use of funds by the management to build empires and to 
increase their private welfare to the detriment of the value of the company. 
There are several studies analyzing the impact of ownership structures on companies’ 
investment in Central and Eastern European transition countries: Lizal and Svejnar (2002) 
(Czech Republic),  Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) (Hungary),  Mickiewicz, Bishop and 
Varblane (2004) (Estonia), Colombo and Stanca (2006) (Hungary). Typically (except Perotti 
and Vesnaver (2004)), the market to book value of equity is not used in the investment 
regressions. The results typically show evidence for soft budget constraints and financial 
imperfections and the cash constraint theory. Typically, state ownership has a negligible 
impact on companies’ investment rates. Using Ukrainian data, Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), 
in a related paper, use the market to book value of equity, emphasize the role of private 
benefits of control and provide evidence for a significantly negative impact of state 
ownership on investment. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the models. Section 
3 provides the estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Companies’ Investment Rates and Private Benefits of Control 
 
In this paper, we use the data set in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) with approximately 
134 listed, large Ukrainian companies and 590 observations over the years 2002 to 2007. The 
companies in the data set come from different sectors of the Ukrainian economy, in 
particular, electricity and energy (21.54%), engineering (11.96%), mining (11.96%), metals 
(6.72%), steel (6.72%),  chemicals (6.72%), and others. More details on the data set can be 
found in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013).  Summary statistics are contained in Table I. The 
data set is derived from Dragon Capital (2006, 2007)), the First Securities Trading System 
PFTS (http://www.pfts.com.ua/ukr/) and the Agency for the Development of Infrastructure 
for Funds Market in Ukraine (www.smida.gov.uk). The ownership data were checked using 
the Ukrainian business press and relate to the years 2005 and 2006, so are basically constant 
over this period. Summary statistics of the ownership group shares are given in Table II. 
Table I: Summary of Financials in US$. 
Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of financials in thousands of US$. MBV is the market-
to-book value of equity. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Table II: Ownership Group Shares 
Variable Mean (%) Std. Dev. Min (%) Max(%) 
State 14.74 0.2784 0 96.8 
Financials Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Total Assets 358938.7 643963.5 8558 74199651 
Fixed Assets 162428.8 264431 433 2052003 
Investment 35233.5 82375.06 -114297 803287 
MBV 2.368675 6.148593 0 99.56863 
Net Income 22927.35 65477.76 -162091 580383 
Depreciation 12509.5 37864.57 -2628 756780 
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Insider 12.57 0.2841 0 96 
NonDomestic 18.21 0.3203 0 98.3 
Finance 16.94 0.312 0 100 
FIG 35.88 0.4064 0 100 
Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the ownership group shares. FIG stands for 
financial and industrial group. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2010, 2013) introduce private benefits of control into a 
marginal Tobin’s Q investment model. The private benefits of control are modeled as shares 
of cash flow that can be diverted out of the company at the expense of passive shareholders.  
This implies that investment is impacted by marginal Q, a measure of the profitability of 
investment, hard and soft budget constraints, shares of ownership groups potentially enjoying 
private benefits of control and control variables.  
In contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), in this paper, we empirically investigate a 
Tobin’s Q model with persistence in the market-to-book value of equity in the sense that the 
investment rates depend on current and lagged market-to-book value. We follow the literature 
and use a positive cash flow coefficient as evidence for hard budget constraints and an 
insignificant or negative cash flow coefficient as evidence for soft budget constraints 
(Mickiewicz, Bishop and Varblane (2004), Lizal and Svejnar (2002)). As in Mykhayliv and 
Zauner (2013) we use ownership shares of different categories of firms measure the 
ownership shares of controllers enjoying private benefits.  Since private benefits of control 
have to be financed, cash flow may also reflect the constraints from financing the private 
benefits. Hence, the estimate for the ownership shares may indicate the impact of private 
benefits of control not already captured by the cash flow and present a low estimate for the 
impact of private benefits of control on investment. 
 
3. Dynamic Q model and Results 
 
First, in contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), we investigate a reduced form regression 
motivated by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004). We 
focus on a Tobin’s Q model where the dependent variable is the investment rate (investment 
to fixed assets ratio), the explanatory variables are the market-to-book value of equity and 
ownership group shares. Control variables are the cash flow to fixed assets ratio, the total 
assets to fixed assets ratio and the leverage to fixed assets ratio. In this regression, the market-
to-book value of equity is a proxy for the investment’s profitability. Cash flow is a proxy for 
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liquidity, soft or hard budget constraints. The ratio of total to fixed assets is a proxy the size 
of the firm. In the transition countries, leverage and cash flow may be related to soft budget 
constraints, but also to investment opportunities.  The regression includes the following set of 
ownership groups: state ownership (state), insider or management ownership (insider), non-
domestic ownership (non-domestic), ownership by banks and other financial companies 
(finance) and ownership by financial and industrial groups and holdings (fig).  
We also investigate two corporate governance variables that we believe are important. 
The first one is the variable majority which relates to control about the company, that is, 
majority ownership of 50% and over without a blocking minority of 25% ownership or more. 
The second variable minority relates to majority ownership with a blocking minority. 
We look at two versions of the model, by focussing on a specification where the 
ownership is measured in shares and where the ownership is measured by an indicator with a 
50% cut-off value. 
The two regressions are given by 
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where i relates to firm i, t  relates to year; itI  is investment, the difference between fixed 
assets at the end and the beginning of year t, itA is fixed assets at the beginning of year t; 
itMBV  is the market-to-book value of equity at the beginning of period t; itCF is cash flow in 
year t; itAssets  are total assets at the beginning of year t, itL  is leverage (total debt) at the 
beginning of year t; jits is ownership of group j  (
figfinancedomesticnoninsiderstatej ,,,,  ) where the ownership is either measured in 
shares or as an indicator  with value 1 if there is a majority ownership of the respective 
ownership group; majorityitd  is the indicator of majority, 
ority
itd
min  is indicator for  minority; td  
are time indicators, t is a time trend, iv is a firm specific error term; and it  is the usual error 
term. 
Table III presents the results of a random effects regression of ownership in shares and 
as indicators since the Hausman tests shows support for random effects over a fixed effects 
specification. 
Table III: Investment Rates and Ownership 
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 Shares Indicator 
Market-to-
book value of 
equity 
.0001
 
(.0093) 
-.0001 
(.0092) 
Cash Flow .7286
*** 
(.0187) 
.7275
*** 
(.0186) 
Total Assets -.3199
*** 
(.0112) 
-.3203
*** 
(.0112) 
Leverage .3399
*** 
(.0152) 
.3408
*** 
(.0151) 
State -.8039
** 
(.3848) 
-.6606
** 
(.2964) 
Insider .1816 
(.3700) 
.0735 
(.2977) 
Non-domestic .5070
* 
(.2735) 
.4707
** 
(.2205) 
Finance .8997
*** 
(.2801) 
.7642
*** 
(.2419) 
FIG -.6759
*** 
(.2543) 
.7710
*** 
(.2114) 
Majority 
 
.0269 
(.2515) 
.0121 
(.2711) 
Significant 
Minority 
 
1.0529
*** 
(.3539) 
1.0269
*** 
(.3705) 
Constant -54.7159 
(84.2018) 
-53.3423 
(83.637) 
Wald χ2 1540.02 
(.0000) 
1569.07 
(0.0000) 
Breusch and 
Pagan 
26.86 
(.0000) 
30.27 
(0.0000) 
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Hausman 
(efficient) 
348.00 
(.0000) 
345.89 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 overall 0.6182 0.6174 
 
Note. Random effects.  Standard errors below the coefficient in brackets. The 10 (5) [1] % level is shown as * 
(**) and [***]. Wald, Breusch and Pagan, and Hausman test statistics (p-values in brackets) uses the estimated 
co-variance matrix of the efficient estimator. 
 
The results show that the market-to-book value of equity is never significant in these 
regressions, as in Perotti and Vesnaver (2004). The estimate for cash flow variable is positive 
and highly significant, consistent with the presence of financial constraints. Larger firms have 
a higher investment rate. In contrast with Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), leverage is positively 
related to investment and highly significant. In contrast with Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and 
Perotti and Vesnaver (2002), state ownership has a negative impact on investment. 
Ownership by financial and non-domestic firms has a positive effect on investment rates. 
Ownership by financial and industrial groups exerts a negative influence on investment.  
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the existence of a significant minority 
has a positive effect on investment.  A possible explanation is that a significant minority 
exerts a disciplining factor on the insider and private benefits of controllers and improves 
corporate governance structures.  
The reduced form regression shows that the market-to-book value of equity does not 
have explanatory power, providing strong evidence for misspecification. 
 
Persistent Market-to-Book Value of Equity 
 
Since the profitability of investment plays no role in the reduced form regression 
above, we try to model the market-to-book value of equity more carefully. First, we introduce 
interaction terms between cash flow and the different ownership groups to test for soft and 
hard budget constraints of the different ownership groups and, second, in contrast with the 
literature, we introduce current and lagged market-to-book value of equity in the regression. 
The regression is given by  
 
 
 
10 
,minmin
3121
ititt
ority
itority
majority
itmajority
k
it
k
k
it
itk
it
k it
it
kitit
it
it
vtddd
s
A
D
d
A
CF
MBVMBV
A
I



 
 
where, in addition to above, k
itd  is the indicator related to ownership group k (with cut-off 
level at 50%)  and the interaction term between cash flow and ownership group indicator, in 
other words, the cash flow sensitivity of investment, 
k
it
it
it d
K
CF
, is a proxy for soft and hard 
budget constraints of ownership group k. 
 
We analyze this dynamic model to control for potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables1 and employ the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments estimator 
estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)) and its improvement by 
Windmeijer (2005) where the regression is estimated simultaneously in levels and first 
differences. The difference regression equation takes care of firm-specific errors and the level 
regression equation allows for the estimation of variables that are constant through time.  
Standard statistical tests are used to test the suitability and validity of the instrumental 
variables without having to resort to analyzing a first stage regression.  
In this estimation we believe that the market-to-book value of equity and the variables 
related to cash flow may be potentially endogenous, that is, current and past errors may be 
correlated with current and future values of the market-to-book value and the variables 
related to cash flow. Generalized Methods of Moments instruments of the level and 
difference regression equation for the market-to-book value of equity and the interaction 
terms cash flow with indicators of ownership groups are specified as the values of the twice-
lagged and earlier variables. Generalized Methods of Moments instruments for the 
predetermined variable Leverage are specified as the values of the once-lagged variable.  The 
usual instruments for the level and difference regression equation are the exogenous 
ownership variables and the lagged-once capital intensity, time dummies and a time trend.  In 
order to reduce the instrument number, we collapse the instruments as discussed in Roodman 
(2006, section 3.2 and 3.5). The matrix H related to variance-covariance matrix of the 
transformed errors is set to the h(2) option.  
                                                          
1 See Lins (2003) for checking the suitability of instruments in the context of companies’ performance in transitional countries. 
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We test the suitability and suitability of the instruments using standard tests in the 
Generalized Methods of Moments framework, the Sargan (1958) test and Hansen (1982) J-
test, including all subgroups of instruments. If the instrumental variables regression is over-
identified, both tests allow us to verify whether the moment conditions are jointly valid. All 
difference-in-Hansen tests for the null hypothesis that the instrument subsets are exogenous 
are insignificant, with the lowest p-value of 0.222 (0.218) in the percentage (indicator) 
ownership model. We also check the suitability of the instruments using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) test for the autoregressive model of order 1 and the autoregressive model of order 2 in 
first differences which looks for autocorrelation  in the errors. Both tests do not lead us to 
question the validity of the instruments and the employed lags in the instruments. We present 
the results of the Generalized Methods of Moments estimation of the investment model in 
Table IV. 
 
Table IV: Investment Rates and Ownership: Generalized Methods of Moments Estimation 
Investment Percentage Indicator 
Market-to-book 
value of equity 
  
-present 
-.0011 
(.0041) 
-.0006 
(.0038) 
-1 lag 
.0030
*** 
(.0007) 
.0029
*** 
(.0007) 
State*CF 
-.0015 
(.1093) 
-.0512 
(.1487) 
Insider*CF 
.0804 
(.2526) 
.0558 
(.1948) 
Non-domestic*CF 
.9836
*** 
(.0162) 
.9852
*** 
(.0152) 
Finance*CF 
1.3805
**
 
(.5520) 
1.4023
*** 
(.5219) 
FIG*CF 
-.9652
* 
(.5704) 
-.9847
* 
(.5301) 
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Leverage 
-.0111 
(.0140) 
-.0139 
(.0140) 
State 
-.1153
* 
(.0647) 
-.0914
* 
(.0526) 
Insider 
.0084 
(.0930) 
-.0161 
(.0674) 
Non-domestic 
-.2354
*** 
(.0555) 
-.2369
*** 
(.0499) 
Finance 
-.2912
** 
(.1348) 
-.27015
** 
(.1251) 
FIG 
.2020 
(.1462) 
.1832 
(.1121) 
Majority 
-.0233 
(.0379) 
.0399 
(.0484) 
Significant Minority 
.0083 
(.0715) 
.0907 
(.0832) 
Constant 
.2368
*** 
(.0450) 
.1848
*** 
(.0353) 
F-Test 
(p-value)
 
302.97 
(.0000) 
344.53 
(.0000) 
Number Instruments 39 39 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
26.34 
(0.194) 
25.81 
(0.214) 
Hansen J 
(p-value) 
20.28 
(0.504) 
19.74 
(0.538) 
Note: Two-step system Generalized Method of Moments estimation. 
 
We discuss the results. In contrast to other studies of Eastern European firms, the 
estimate for the market-to-book value of equity (lagged once) is highly significant and 
positive. In one of the only empirical investment studies of Eastern European transitional 
economies that uses the market-to-book value of equity to explain investment,  Perotti and 
Vesnaver (2004) observe that this variable and similar profit proxies do not have any 
explanatory power for investment. This may be due to capital market imperfections and 
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underdeveloped capital markets (Lizal and Svejnar (2002), footnote 22, p. 359), Mickiewicz, 
Bishop and Varblane (2004)). 
We discuss the impact of the ownership categories on firms’ investment in turn, both 
for the indicator and percentage model. The indicator specification can be interpreted as the 
impact of the presence of a majority ownership of the respective ownership group on 
investment rates, whereas the percentage specification can be interpreted as the impact of an 
increase in ownership shares of the respective ownership group on firms’ investment rates.  
For each ownership group we discuss the impact of the particular ownership type on firms’ 
investment rates and also on the interaction of cash flow and the indicator of the particular 
ownership type to provide evidence for soft and hard budget constraints of the ownership 
type.  
State ownership exerts a negative influence on firms’ investment. This is in contrast 
with the typical result regarding Eastern European economies (see, for example, Lizal and 
Svejnar (2002) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)). The cash flow sensitivity with respect to 
state ownership (State*CF) is not significant which indicates that state-owned companies 
face soft budget constraints. State ownership has a significantly negative impact on firms’ 
investment rates. The two results regarding state ownership are consistent with the presence 
of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)), and private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart 
(1988)). 
Insider ownership does not significantly impact firms’ investment rates. The variable 
Insider*CF is positive, but insignificant indicating that insider owned firms do not face hard 
but soft budget constraints and appear to be subject to free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and 
private benefits. 
Firms with ownership by non-domestic entities and by banks and financial firms 
experience a negative impact on firms’ investment rates and severe hard budget constraints as 
do firms with ownership by financial and industrial groups and holdings.  
Concerning ownership by financial firms and banks, the estimate of 
Financial*Cashflow is significant and large positive, indicating that firms owned by financial 
firms also face severe financial constraints. Finance ownership is negatively associated with 
investment. 
The corporate governance variables related to majority and significant minority 
ownership do not impact on firms’ investment rates significantly. 
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The results on finance companies’ ownership are new, the results on other ownership 
types strengthen the evidence presented in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) using a different 
model. In contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), debt does not have explanatory power in 
this model. 
4. Conclusions 
 
Using data from large Ukrainian firms for the period 2002-2007, we studied companies’ 
investment rates as a function of ownership and corporate governance variables. The 
empirical analysis shows that the lagged market-to-book value of equity explains investment 
rates and is informative. There appears to be evidence for a soft budget constraint facing state 
owned firms. State ownership appears to be negatively related to investment due to private 
benefits of control, tunnelling or asset stripping consistent with Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013, 
2015). Other ownership groups, like ownership by non-domestic or finance firms face hard 
budget constraints. Firms with ownership by financial and industrial groups and ownership 
by insider do not appear to suffer from hard budget constraints.  These ownership groups 
appear to be subject soft budget constraints. In the case of insider ownership this is consistent 
with the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). Since firms’ investment is not impacted 
positively or negatively by ownership of insider or financial and industrial groups, it appears 
likely that they suffer from private benefits of control.  
These results also seem to indicate that state, financial, and foreign ownership suffer 
from underinvestment due to private benefits of control or even asset stripping in the case of 
state ownership and due to financial constraints in the case of financial and foreign 
ownership. It is also likely that firms with insider ownership do not suffer from 
underinvestment consistent with the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). 
The results on financial companies’ ownership and leverage are new, other results are 
consistent with results found in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013). 
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